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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

DON SCOTT TAYLOR,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

)

Case No.

vs.

)

Priority 15

CHARLEEN TAYLOR,

)

Defendant/Appellee

930381-CA

]

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this Appeal pursuant to
Section 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended as
this is an appeal from a final order and decree of the Third
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County regarding a divorce
action.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS FOR REVIEW
1.

May this Court consider on Appeal either the issue of

the division of the Appellant's retirement account when the
Appellant did not raise an objection to either issue below?

A

reviewing court will not consider matters on appeal which were
not properly preserved or raised in the court below.

Barson v.

E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 837-838 (Utah 1984).

2.

Did the Trial Court Abuse its Discretion by awarding the

Appellee half of the contributions made to the Appellant's
retirement account during the duration of the marriage which the
Trial Court defined as beginning on the date of marriage and
ending upon the date of the entry of the divorce decree?

The

standard of review is that the reviewing "court may not alter or
reverse such a disposition unless it represents a clear abuse of
the discretion so vested in the trial court."

Pope v. Pope, 598

P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1979) citing to Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527
P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974) and Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah
1974) .
3.

Did the Trial Court Abuse its Discretion by requiring

the Appellant to pay the Appellee's attorney's fees incurred in
defending the divorce proceeding pursuant to §30-3-3, Utah Code
Annotated?

In reviewing an award of costs in a divorce action,

the Court of Appeals will use an abuse of discretion standard.
Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1310 (Utah App. 1991) citing
to Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686-87 (Utah App. 1990).
4.

Should this Court require the Appellant to Pay the

Appellee's Attorney Fees incurred in Defending this Appeal
pursuant to §30-3-3, Utah Code Annotated?

This Court may award

such attorney's fees if it finds that the evidence supports a
finding that the Appellee has financial need, the Appellant has
the ability to pay and the attorney's fee are reasonable.
Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1310 (Utah App. 1991).
5.

Is the Appellant's Appeal in this Case Frivolous
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pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
entitling the Appellee to an Award of Attorneys fees and double
Costs?

This Court may find this Appeal, or any part thereof,

Frivolous if the Appeal is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend,
modify or reverse existing law.

See Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d

193, 199 (Utah App. 1992).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Section 30-3-3, Utah Code Annotated (1993). Award of costs,
attorney and witness fees - Temporary alimony.
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6,
and in any action to establish an order of custody,
visitation, child support, alimony or division of property
in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the
costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert
witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party
to prosecute or defend the action. The order may include
provision for costs of the action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody,
visitation, child support, alimony or division of property
in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney
fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed
upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion,
may award no fees or limited fees against a party if the
court finds the party is impecunious or enters in the record
the reason for not awarding fees.
(3) In any listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a
party to provide money, during the pendency of the action,
for separate support and maintenance of the other party and
of any children in the custody of the other party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the
final order or judgment may be amended during the course of
the action or in the final order or judgment.
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33. Damages for delay or
frivolous Appeal; recovery of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a
first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court
determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these
rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages, which may include single or double costs, as
defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the
prevailing party. The court may order that the damages be
paid by the party or the party's attorney.

£

(b) Definitions. For purposes of these rules, a frivolous
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not
based on a good faith argument to extend modify or reverse
existing law. An appeal, motion, brief or other paper
interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for
any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless
increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion brief, or
other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any
party or upon its own motion. A party may request
damages under this rule only as part of the appellee's
motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part
of appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response
to a motion or other paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the
court, the court shall issue to the party or the
party's attorney or both an order to show cause why
such damages should not be awarded. The order to show
cause shall set forth the allegations which form the
basis of the damages and permit at least ten days in
which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good
cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of
the notice of oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may
be awarded, the court shall grant a hearing.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 46. Exceptions unnecessary.
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are
unnecessary. It is sufficient that a party, at the time the
ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known
to the court the action which he desires the court to take
or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds
therefor; and if a party has no opportunity to object to a
ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an
objection does not thereafter prejudice him.
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION.
orders, judgments and decrees.

Rule 4-504

Written

Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written
orders, judgments and decrees to the court. This rule is not
intended to change existing law with respect to the
enforceability of unwritten agreements.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in courts

9

except small claims.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or
parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen days, or within
a shorter time as the court may direct, file with the court a
proposed order, judgment or decree in conformity with the ruling.
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments and orders
shall be served upon opposing counsel before being presented to
the court for signature unless the court otherwise orders.
Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court and counsel
within five days after service.
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be
reduced to writing and-presented to the court for signature
within fifteen days of the settlement and dismissal.
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall
be served upon the opposing party and proof of such services
shall be filed with the court. All judgments, orders and
decrees, or copies thereof, which are transmitted after signature
by the judge, including other correspondence requiring a reply,
must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid
postage.
(5) All orders, judgments and decrees shall be prepared in
such a manner as to show whether they are entered upon the
stipulation of counsel, the motion of counsel, or upon the
court's own initiative and shall identify the attorneys of record
in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or decree
is made.
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and
decrees shall contain the address or last known address of the
judgment debtor and he social security number of the judgment
debtor if known.
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate
documents and shall not include any matters by reference unless
otherwise directed by the court. Orders not constituting
judgments or decrees may be made part of the document containing
the stipulation or motion upon which the order is based.
(8) No orders, judgments or decrees based upon stipulation
shall be signed or entered unless the stipulation is in writing,
signed by the attorneys of record for the respective parties and
filed with the clerk or the stipulation was made on the record.
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written
obligation to pay money and a judgment has previously been
rendered upon the same written obligation, the plaintiff or
plaintiff's counsel shall attach a copy of all previous judgments
based upon the same written obligation.
(10) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit
the power of any court, upon a proper showing, to enforce a
settlement agreement or any other agreement which has not been
reduced to writing.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

THE PARTIES
Mr. and Mrs. Taylor were married on July 17, 1980 (Trial

Transcript., p. 3, line 12).

At the time of their marriage, Mr.

Taylor was 43 years old and Mrs. Taylor was 49 years old.
were no children born as issue of this marriage.

There

(Trial

Transcript., p. 3, lines 22-24).
At the time of the parties marriage, Mr. Taylor was employed
as a United States Postal Service mailhandler and was
continuously employed during the marriage.

(Trial Transcript.,

p. 15, lines 17-20) . At the time of their marriage, Mrs. Taylor
was employed as a secretary for Alliance Equipment Company.
(Trial Transcript, p. 103 line 24 through p. 104 line 3).

Mrs.

Taylor ceased working for Alliance Equipment Company in
approximately February of 1984 to resume full time duties as a
housewife.
4).

(Trial Transcript, p. 104 line 20 through p. 105 line

Mr. Taylor did not object to Mrs. Taylor's decision to

resume duties as a full time housewife and mother to both of
their children from prior marriages.

(Trial Transcript, p. 105

lines 5-8) .
Mr. and Mrs. Taylor separated on New Year's Eve Day of 1984.
(Trial Transcript, p. 106 lines 3-5).
2.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr. and Mrs. Taylor were married on July 17, 1980 (Trial

Transcript., p. 3, line 12).

Mr. and Mrs. Taylor separated on

New Year's Eve Day of 1984.

(Trial Transcript, p. 106 lines 311

5).

Sometime in either 1989 or 1990, the parties came before a

Court Commissioner who ordered Mr. Taylor to pay Mrs. Taylor
$400.00 per month in temporary alimony.

(Trial Transcript, p. 22

line 24 through p. 23 line 12).
Mr. Taylor filed for divorce on December 6, 1990. Mrs.
Taylor filed an answer on January 15, 1991. Additionally, Mrs.
Taylor filed a Motion for Order on Temporary Matters on January
15, 1991. Discovery commenced in January of 1991 and proceeded
through October of 1992. Trial was scheduled for and held on
November 2, 1992.

Following the trial, the Court made a ruling

granting the divorce based on irreconcilable differences.

(Trial

Transcript, p. 161 lines 6-12) . The court made findings as to
both premarital property and an equitable distribution of marital
property.
11).

(Trial Transcript, p. 161 line 13 through p. 162 line

Additionally, the Court made a ruling awarding both alimony

and attorney's fees to Mrs. Taylor.
line 12 through p. 163 line 1).

(Trial Transcript, p. 162

Mrs. Taylor's attorney was

requested to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
consistent with the Court's ruling.

(Trial Transcript, p. 163

lines 5-8).
Mr. Tycksen, counsel for Mrs. Taylor, prepared Findings of
Facts and Conclusions of Law which were submitted to Mr. Taylor's
attorney prior to submission to the Court pursuant to Rule 4-504
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

Counsel for Mr.

Taylor filed objections to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law on December 16, 1992. Oral Argument was heard on April 5,
12

1993 regarding Mr. Taylor's objections to the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law.

On April 7, 1993, the Court made a

minute entry ruling on Mr. Taylor's objections to the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.

On May 4, 1993, Judge Noel executed

the revised Divorce Decree and the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

An appeal was thereafter filed by Mr,

Taylor.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This court may not address the issue of the Trial Court's
division of Mr. Taylor's retirement account because counsel for
Mr. Taylor failed to preserve this error by raising an objection
below.

This Court will not consider matters which have not been

properly preserved through objection below.
Assuming arguendo that Counsel for Mr. Taylor did properly
object below, this Court should affirm the Trial Court's
discretion with respect to the division of Mr. Taylor's
retirement account.

Specifically, the Trial Court followed Utah

law by valuing the retirement account on the date of the entry of
divorce.

Further, there was no evidence that Mrs. Taylor

dissipated any assets or in any manner acted obstructively which
would have permitted the Trial Court to value the marital assets
at a time other than the date of the entry of the divorce decree.
There being no clear abuse of discretion, this Court should
affirm the Trial Court's ruling on the division of Mr. Taylor's
retirement account.
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
13

Mrs. Taylor attorney's fees.

The Trial Court heard substantial

evidence on Mrs. Taylor's need, Mr. Taylor's ability to pay and
on the reasonableness of the fees incurred.

Because the Trial

Court did not abuse its discretion with respect to the award of
Attorney's fees, this Court must affirm the Trial Court's ruling
on this issue.
Mrs. Taylor is entitled to attorney's fees incurred in
defending this appeal.

The lower court established Mrs. Taylor's

need, Mr. Taylor's ability to pay and the reasonableness of the
fees incurred.

In Utah, where a party to a divorce action is

awarded attorney's fees at the trial level, such fees are also
awarded on appeal pursuant to §30-3-3, Utah Code Annotated
(1993) . Thus, this Court should award Mrs. Taylor attorney fees
incurred on this appeal.
This court should award Mrs. Taylor both attorney fees and
double costs on this appeal because Mr. Taylor's appeal is
frivolous pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

This appeal is frivolous because it is not well

grounded in either fact or law nor is there a good faith argument
for the extension, modification or reversal of current law.
Thus, because this appeal is frivolous pursuant to Rule 33 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court should award Mrs.
Taylor all of her attorneys fees and double costs.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD DISREGARD THE APPELLANT'S APPEAL ON THE
ISSUE OF THE DIVISION OF HIS RETIREMENT ACCOUNT BECAUSE THE
APPELLANT FAILED TO PRESERVE THIS AS ERROR BY OBJECTING
BELOW.
14

This court should disregard the Appellant's appeal on the
issue of the division of his retirement account because the
Appellant failed to preserve this issue as error by objecting
below.

It is a well established principle of Utah law that a

reviewing court will not address matters on appeal which were not
properly preserved by objection below.

In State v. Ortiz, 118

Utah Adv. Rep. 75, 76 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), this Court said, "a
contemporaneous or some form of specific preservation of claims
of error must be made a part of the trial court record before an
appellate court will review such a claim on appeal."

See also

Brobera v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989); Lopez v.
Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 781 (Utah 1986); and Barson v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984) . Thus, if
Appellant did not object below, this Court may not consider the
issue of the division of his retirement account on appeal.
There is nothing in the record which indicates that the
Appellant objected to the Trial Court's determination that the
contributions paid into Appellant's retirement account should be
divided equally between the parties.

"The Burden is always on

the party objecting to make,certain that the record adequately
preserves an objection or argument for review in the event of an
appeal."

Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.. 682 P.2d 832, 837

(Utah 1984).

The appellant had the opportunity to object to the

Court's characterization of the marriage as still in effect until
the divorce was granted.

(Trial Transcript, p. 134 lines 6-21) .

Additionally, the Appellant objected to the Court's Findings of
15

Fact and Conclusions of Law without objecting to the Court's
ruling on the division of the Appellant's retirement account.
See Plaintiff's Objections to Findings of Fact and Conclusions o:
Law attached hereto as Appendix 1.

Thus, because the Appellant

failed to carry his burden of insuring that the record reflected
his objection, this Court should not address this issue on
appeal.
Mrs. Taylor recognizes that a formal exception or objection
is no longer required to preserve errors under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 46 states

Rule 46. Exceptions unnecessary.
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are
unnecessary. It is sufficient that a party, at the time the
ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known
to the court the action which he desires the court to take
or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds
therefor; and if a party has no opportunity to object to a
ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an
objection does not thereafter prejudice him.
However, the fact that Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure does not require a formal objection, does not abrogate
that Appellant's obligation to make some form of statement which
puts the Trial Court on notice that the Appellant disagrees with
the ruling or order.

In Brobercr v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah

App. 1989), at footnote 2, this court said
Although Utah R. Civ. P. 46 provides that a "formal"
exception to a ruling is not required, the rule does not
excuse the necessity to record any objection or exception at
all.
Thus, Appellant had the obligation to make his exception to the
Trial Court's ruling known to the Trial Court so that the Trial
Court had the opportunity to rule on the objection.
16

Having

failed to so notify the court or preserve his objection in any
other way, the Appellant should not be permitted to raise this
issue on appeal.

Therefore, the Appellee requests this Court

rule that the Appellant is not entitled to review on the issue of
the division of his retirement benefits.
II.

ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT MR. TAYLOR DID PRESERVE HIS
OBJECTION BELOW, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION BY AWARDING MRS. TAYLOR FIFTY PERCENT OF THE
CONTRIBUTIONS MADE TO THAT ACCOUNT DURING THE TWELVE YEAR
COURSE OF THE MARRIAGE.
In this case, there is nothing inequitable nor was it an

abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to determine that Mrs.
Taylor was entitled to share one half of Mr. Taylor's U.S. Postal
Service Retirement Account commencing with the date of the
parties' marriage and terminating on the date that the Decree of
Divorce was signed, which was May 4, 1993.
TIME USED TO VALUE AND DIVIDE MARITAL PROPERTY
For purposes of equitable distribution, marital property is
valued at the time of trial. This is a well settled principle of
Utah law.

In Proudfit v. Proudfit. 598 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah

1979), the Utah Supreme Court said
Under Utah divorce law, the trial court is empowered to make
such disposition of property between the parties as is
equitable. As [sic] reviewing court may not alter or
reverse such a disposition unless it represents a clear
abuse of discretion so vested in the trial court.
Proudfit at 1319 citing to Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359
(Utah 1974) and Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974).
Thus, the Appellant has the burden on appeal to show that such an
abuse of discretion occurred.

Because the Appellant has failed
17

to show such an abuse of discretion, this Court must affirm the
ruling of the Trial Court.
The Trial Court properly valued Mr. Taylor's U.S. Postal
Service Retirement Account on the date of the Decree of Divorce.
In Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Utah 1980), the
court said, "the marital estate is evaluated according to the
existing property interests at the time the marriage is
terminated by decree of the court."

Fletcher at 1222 citing to

Hamilton v. Hamilton, 562 P.2d 235 (Utah 1977) and Jesperson v.
Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980).

This rule of valuing

property at the time of the entry of the divorce decree is well
entrenched in Utah law.

See also Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695,

697 (Utah 1985); Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1051 (Utah App.
1987); Anderson v. Anderson, 757 P.2d 476, 479 (Utah App. 1988);
Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah App. 1990); Howell v.
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1991).

In fact, as

recently as four months prior to Mr. Taylor filing his appeal,
this Court reiterated the rule that marital property should be
valued at the time of the entry of the divorce decree.

See

Hoagland v. Hoagland, 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 26 (Utah App. 1993).
Mr. Taylor correctly asserts that the general rule of
valuing marital property at the date of entry of the Decree of
Divorce is not without exceptions. In Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050
(Utah App. 1987), this Court explained the circumstances under
which the trial court may exercise its discretion to value the
marital estate at some time other than the date of the entry of
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the decree of divorce.

In Peck, this Court said,

where one party has dissipated an asset, hidden its value,
or otherwise acted obstructively, the trial court may, under
its broad discretion, value the property at an earlier date,
i.e. separation.
Peck at 1052, citing to In re Marriage of Priddis, 132 Cal App.
3d 349, 183 Cal. Rptr. 37, 39 (1982) and In re Marriage of
Stallcup. 97 Cal. App. 3d 294, 158 Cal. Rptr. 679, 682 (1979)
[emphasis added].

In Peck, the trial court valued the

Defendant's business at the time of separation rather than at the
time of the entry of the divorce decree.

The Defendant in Peck

acted obstructively by closing the corporations accounts and
ceasing all business recording keeping at the time the parties
separated.

Therefore, the trial court exercised its discretion

to value the marital property at a time other than the date of
the entry of the divorce decree because the Defendant acted
obstructively.
In Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991), the
trial court valued the parties standard of living at the time of
separation.

However, following the separation, the Plaintiff's

income doubled as a result of a corporate take over of his
employer's business.

On appeal, this court remanded the case for

the trial court to base alimony on the standard of living at the
time of the entry of the divorce decree.

In Howell, neither of

the parties acted obstructively, dissipated or otherwise
attempted to hide any assets.
In the present case, there is no evidence that either party
acted obstructively/ dissipated or attempted to hide any assets.
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In fact, Mr. Taylor asserts only that the Trial Court abused its
discretion because the parties were separated for a substantial
period of time before Mr. Taylor filed for divorce and that the
parties ceased to function as a marital unit when the parties
separated.
Mr. Taylor could have filed for divorce at any time he so
chose.

He did not do so for many years following the separation.

There is no evidence in the record as to why Mr. Taylor waited so
long to file for divorce.

This Court should not attempt to infer

reasons for Mr. Taylor's conduct when there is not evidence from
which to draw such inferences.

The fact that the parties were

separated for a long period of time before Mr. Taylor filed for
divorce was completely within the control of Mr. Taylor.

The

trial court did not abuse its discretion by valuing the property
at the time of the entry of the divorce decree when there was no
evidence of obstruction, dissipation or otherwise attempting to
hide assets.
Mr. Taylor also asserts that the trial court abused its
discretion in valuing the property at the time of the entry of
the divorce decree because the parties ceased functioning as a
marital unit when they separated.

In making this argument, Mr.

Taylor relies on Hoagland v. Hoagland, 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 26
(Utah App. 1993) . In Hoagland, the had been experiencing both
marital and financial troubles when the husband-Defendant
attempted to improve their respective standard of living by
taking a job in Nevada.

After securing employment and purchasing
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a home, he invited his wife-Plaintiff to join him in Nevada.

She

declined and filed for divorce.
The trial court in Hoacrland ruled that the standard of
living for purposes of alimony was that standard of living
existing at the time of separation not at the time of divorce.
On review, this Court said,
Here the court found that Wife has not become accustomed to
a high standard of living during the marriage . . . . Here,
Wife did not want-to move from her home in Utah to continue
the marriage, yet she wanted to benefit from the higher
standard of living, obtained in part, as a result of
Husband's relocation. Moreover, the court found that the
marriage essentially ended when Husband moved out of Utah.
Hoacrland at 26.
The present case is distinguishable from Hoaaland.

First,

in Hoaaland, it was the Plaintiff-Wife who did not want to
continue the marriage, yet wanted the benefit of the higher
standard of living.

In the present case, it was Mr. Taylor who

did not want to continue the marriage.

(Trial Transcript, p. 106

lines 3-5). It was Mr. Taylor who did not immediately file for
divorce.

And it is now Mr. Taylor who wishes to reduce the award

the Trial Court, in the proper exercise of its discretion,
granted to Mrs. Taylor.

Thus, the present case is factually

distinguishable from Hoaaland.
Mr. Taylor wishes this Court to interpret Hoaaland as
standing for the proposition that a the date of valuation of
marital property should be the date upon which the marriage
essentially ended.

Such an interpretation is inherently fraught

with future problems for the judiciary.
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All marriages that end

in divorce essentially end as functioning marriages long before
the separation occurs.
This Court should not adopt a standard of valuing property
at the time the marriage ceases to function as such.

The logical

result of such a standard will be parties seeking to value
property prior to the date of separation.

Every party to a

divorce will tell a woeful tale of how the marriage ceased to
function as a marriage-months and even years before the parties
physically separated.
Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion with
respect to the division of Mr. Taylor's U.S. Postal Service
Retirement Account because it was following controlling Utah
precedent.

In Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah

1987), the Utah Supreme Court addressed the very issue which is
before this Court today.

In Alexander, the "Plaintiff argue[d]

that contributions he made to the profit-sharing plan after the
defendant left the marital home but before the marriage was
terminated should not be included in the marital estate."

The

Utah Supreme Court's definitive response to this argument in a
published two word opinion was "We disagree."

Alexander at 224.

The trial court properly followed precedent and did not abuse its
discretion in the manner in which it chose to divide the
Plaintiff's retirement account.
In the present case, the Trial Court properly exercised its
discretion in dividing Mr. Taylor's U.S. Postal Service
Retirement Account.

The record contains no evidence that Mrs.
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Taylor acted obstructively, dissipated or otherwise attempted to
hide assets.
marriage.

Mr. Taylor was the party who wished to end the

Yet Mr. Taylor did not file this action until six

years after he left Mrs. Taylor.
its discretion.

The Trial Court did not abuse

Therefore, this Court should affirm the Trial

Court's ruling on the disposition of Mr. Taylor's U.S. Postal
Service Retirement Account.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
ORDERED MR, TAYLOR TO PAY MRS. TAYLOR'S ATTORNEY FEES
AND COSTS PURSUANT TO §30-3-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Mr.

Taylor to pay the attorney fees and costs incurred by Mrs. Taylor
in defending this action pursuant to §30-3-3, U.C.A. (1993).

The

trial court based this ruling on substantial evidence of Mrs.
Taylor's need, Mr. Taylor's ability to pay and the reasonableness
of the fees incurred.

Because the Trial Court did not abuse its

discretion, this Court must affirm the Trial Court's award of
attorney fees and costs to Mrs. Taylor.
Section 30-3-3(1) permits the Trial Court to award either
party costs, attorney and witness fees.

Section 30-3-3(1) states

In any action . . . to establish an order of custody,
visitation, child support, alimony or division of property
in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the
costs, attorney fees and witness fees, including expert
witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party
to prosecute or defend the action. The order may include
provision for costs of the action.
§30-3-3(1), U.C.A. (1993).

The cases interpreting this section

have universally stated that the trial court is vested with great
discretion as to awarding costs and attorney fees to either
23.

party.1

Before awarding attorneys fees to any party, the trial

court must find the financial need of the spouse receiving
support, the ability to pay of the other spouse and the
reasonableness of the fees incurred.

See e.g. Crockett v.

Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah App. 1992) citing to Bell v.
Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1991); Rasband v. Rasband, 752
P.2d 1331, 1337 (Utah App. 1988); and Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d
83, 89 (Utah App. 1987)-.

The trial court did not abuse its

discretion in awarding to Mrs. Taylor her costs and attorney fees
because there was ample evidence of her need as the spouse
receiving support, Mr. Taylor's ability to pay, and the
reasonableness of the fees incurred.
The record clearly establishes that Mrs. Taylor is in
financial need.

The trial court had before it Mrs. Taylor's

Financial Declaration (attached hereto as Appendix 2) which
stated that Mrs. Taylor's expenses exceeded her income by
$397.65.

Additionally, the trial court heard testimony as to

Mrs. Taylor's income (Trial Transcript, p.112, line 4; p. 112
lines 14-16; p. 112 lines 23-25; p. 147 lines 7-25; and p. 150
lines 15-18) and expenses (Trial Transcript, p. 126 line 22
through p. 127 line 22; p. 147 lines 7-25; p. 148 lines 17-24; p.
150 line 3-7 and lines 18-21).

This testimony revealed that at

1

See Burtt v. Burtt, 204 P. 91, 94 (Utah 1922); Weiss v.
Weiss, 179 P.2d 1005, 1009 (Utah 1947); Walther v. Walther. 709
P.2d 387, 388 (Utah 1985); Mauahan v. Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156, 162
(Utah App. 1989); Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 123 (Utah App.
1990); Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1991); Crouse v.
Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah App. 1991) ;and Peterson v.
Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1310 (Utah App. 1991).
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the time of trial Mrs. Taylor's expenses exceeded her income by
approximately $500.00.

(Trial Transcript p. 150 lines 18-21).

Thus, the trial court had ample evidence of Mrs. Taylor's need.
The trial court found that Mr. Taylor had the ability to
pay.

The record contained more than sufficient evidence for the

trial court to make this determination.

The record contained two

financial declarations made by Mr. Taylor.

The first, executed

on March 8, 1991 (attached hereto as Appendix 3) indicated that
Mr. Taylor's income exceeded his expenses by $851.08. The
second, executed on October 30, 1992 (attached hereto as Appendix
4) indicated that Mr. Taylor's income exceeded his expenses by
$216.33.

Included in Mr. Taylor's monthly expenses in this

latter financial declaration was the earlier award of $400.00 in
temporary alimony.

In addition to Mr. Taylor's financial

declarations, the trial court heard testimony as to Mr. Taylor's
income (Trial Transcript, p. 15 lines 17-24; p. 47 lines 8-11; p.
71 lines 7-21; p. 72 lines 21-25 and p. 73 line 12 through p. 74
line 1) and expenses (Trial Transcript, p. 18 line 23 through p.
19 line 19; p. 21 lines 5-24; p. 22 lines 2-22; p. 23 lines 8-12;
p. 69 line 21 through p. 71 line 3; p. 95 lines 20-25; p. 98
lines 13-23; p. 99 lines 10-13; and p. 101 line 3-21).

This

testimony revealed that Mr. Taylor's income approximately
exceeded his expenses by $500.00 per month.
p. 47 lines 8-11).

(Trial Transcript,

Thus, the trial court had more than enough

factual information upon which to determine that Mr. Taylor had
the ability to pay Mrs. Taylor's attorney fees and costs.
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The record contained sufficient information for the trial
court to determine that the fees incurred by Mrs. Taylor in
defending this action were reasonable.

The trial court heard

testimony that Mrs. Taylor paid her first attorney $1,489.50 who
withdrew from this action.
through p. 159 line 1).

(Trial Transcript, p. 158 line 24

Mrs. Taylor's present counsel submitted

into evidence an affidavit stating the amount of fees he had
charged in this action.- Mr. Taylor's attorney did not object to
the admission of this affidavit.

(Trial Transcript, p. 158 lines

13-23) . The trial court heard testimony that Mrs. Taylor spent
$2,122.61 in preparation for trial and approximately $1,125.00 in
trial time and estimated post-trial completion work.

(Trial

Transcript, p. 159 lines 2-8). Mrs. Taylor's counsel then made a
proffer which stated that he was licensed to practice in Utah,
worked diligently on this case, bills $125 per hour and that in
light of his years of experience and the necessity for the hours
incurred, such fees were reasonable.

Mr. Taylor's counsel

accepted the proffer without objection (Trial Transcript, p. 160
lines 4-12) . Thus, the trial court had ample evidence in the
record to determine the reasonableness of the attorney fees
incurred.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring
Mr. Taylor to pay the costs and attorney fees incurred by Mrs.
Taylor in defending this action.

The record contained ample

evidence to support the trial court's finding that Mrs. Taylor
had financial need, that Mr. Taylor had the ability to pay and

2£

that the fees incurred were reasonable.

Based on the foregoing,

this Court must affirm the trial court's ruling on attorney fees
and costs.
IV.

THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD MRS. TAYLOR HER COSTS AND ATTORNEY
FEES IN DEFENDING THIS APPEAL.
It is a well settled principle of Utah law that the

provisions of Section 30-3-3 applies to attorney fees and costs
on appeal.

See Mauahan v. Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156, 162-63 (Utah

App. 1989); See also Ostler v. Ostler, 798 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah
App. 1990).

Moreover, in Crouse v. Crouse. 817 P.2d 836, 840

(Utah App. 1991), this Court said
Ordinarily when fees in a divorce have been awarded below to
the party who then prevails on appeal, fees will also be
awarded to that party on appeal.
Crouse at 840 quoting Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489. 494 (Utah App.
1991) quoting Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d, 1166, 1171 (Utah App.
1990) . Finally, it is not necessary for the party to prevail on
appeal in order to award costs and fees pursuant to Section 30-33(1), U.C.A. (1993).

See Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 427

(Utah App. 1990) citing to Ostler v. Ostler, 798 P.2d 713, 717
(Utah App. 1990) .
In the present case, this Court should award Mrs. Taylor
attorneys fees and costs in defending this appeal regardless of
whether or not she prevails.

The record below strongly indicates

Mrs. Taylor's need, Mr. Taylor's ability to pay and the
reasonableness of the fees incurred.

The trial court found that

Mrs. Taylor was entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs
in the action below.

It is the general rule in this jurisdiction
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that such a party is also entitled to costs and attorney fees on
appeal.

While prevailing is not necessary, the rule is

especially true where the party receiving the support prevails on
the appeal.

Thus, this Court should award Mrs. Taylor the costs

and attorney's fees for defending this appeal.
V.

THIS COURT SHOULD FIND MR. TAYLORS APPEAL FRIVOLOUS AND
AWARD MRS. TAYLOR ATTORNEY FEES AND DOUBLE COSTS PURSUANT TO
RULE 33 OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states
Damages for delay or frivolous Appeal; recovery of
attorney7s fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a
first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court
determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these
rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages, which may include single or double costs, as
defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the
prevailing party. The court may order that the damages be
paid by the party or the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For purposes of these rules, a frivolous
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not
based on a good faith argument to extend modify or reverse
existing law. An appeal, motion, brief or other paper
interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for
any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless
increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion brief, or
other paper.

Rule 33(a) & (b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1993).
This appeal is frivolous as defined in Rule 33(b) because it
is not well grounded in fact.
well grounded in fact.

First, Mr. Taylor's claims are not

An example of such baseless factual

claims is, in addressing the issue of Mrs. Taylor's need for
attorneys fees. Mr. Taylor's brief says
The only manner in which Defendant addressed this issue at
trial was as follows: Defendant's Counsel asked Defendant,
x
Now are your asking for some contribution from Mr. Taylor
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to
help you with attorney's fees?'
x
Yes.' (Tr., p. 159)
See Appellant's Brief, p. 15.

Defendant responds,

Factually, the record contains a

significant amount of testimony and other evidence as to Mrs.
Taylor's need. See Argument III. Thus, Mr. Taylor's appeal is
not well grounded in fact.
Mr. Taylor's appeal is frivolous because it is not well
grounded in law.

The law is deeply entrenched with respect to

the issues presented.

Additionally, Mr. Taylor fails to fully

apprise this Court of the law relevant to each issue presented.
For instance, while Mr. Taylor admits that the general rule is to
value property at the time of the entry of the divorce decree, he
urges this court to recognize the need for exceptions to this
rule.

However, Mr. Taylor fails to point out that this court has

already ruled on when and what exceptions apply to this rule such
as when one of the parties has behaved obstructively or has
either hidden or dissipated assets.

Moreover, he fails to argue

why the exception he seeks should be added to the existing rule
and with respect to this same issue, he fails to point to the one
contrary case in this jurisdiction which is on all fours
factually with this case.

Mr. Taylor fails to inform this Court

that the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that it is not an abuse of
discretion to include as part of the marital estate those
contributions made to a profit sharing plan after the parties
separated but before the marriage was legally terminated.

Thus.

Mr. Taylor's brief is not well grounded in law.
Mr. Taylor's brief is frivolous because it is not based on a
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good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law.
Mr. Taylor's arguments addressing the question of attorney fees
fails to fully develop the factual record.

Upon a careful look

at the record, it is clear that the trial court had sufficient
evidence before it to establish Mrs. Taylor's need, Mr. Taylor's
ability to pay and the reasonableness of the fees incurred.

On

the issue of attorney fees, Mr. Taylor does not have a good faith
argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law.
Mr. Taylor does not have a good faith argument for the
extension, modification or reversal of existing law with respect
to the issue of the retirement account.

Mr. Taylor's arguments

in this section amount to little more than a plea to this court
to find that his retirement account fits into one of the narrow
exceptions which will permit him to hold on to a greater
percentage of the money the trial court found, based on competent
evidence and the precedent of Utah law, to be marital assets.
Mr. Taylor's appeal is frivolous pursuant to Rule 33(a) and
(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Under Rule 33(a),

this court has the power to sanction a party who files a
frivolous appeal by awarding the defending party double costs and
reasonable attorney's fees.

Because this appeal is frivolous,

Mrs. Taylor asks this Court to sanction Mr. Taylor by awarding
her double costs and attorney's fees on this appeal.
CONCLUSION
This Court should not consider Mr. Taylor's claims
concerning the disposition of his retirement account because Mr.
10

Taylor failed to object to this disposition in any way.

Assuming

arguendo that such an objection is no longer necessary, this
Court should affirm the trial court's disposition of this account
because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by valuing
the account as of the date of the entry of the divorce decree.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
costs and attorney fees to Mrs. Taylor pursuant to §30-3-3,
U.C.A. (1993) . The evidence clearly establishes that Mrs, Taylor
has need, Mr. Taylor has the ability to pay and that the fees
incurred were reasonable.

Thus, this court should affirm the

trial court's grant of attorney fees to Mrs. Taylor.

Because of

the foregoing, this Court should grant costs and attorney fees
incurred in defending this appeal to Mrs. Taylor.
This Court should rule that Mr. Taylor's appeal is
frivolous.
law.

Mr. Taylor's appeal is not well grounded in fact or

Mr. Taylor does not have a good faith argument for the

extension, modification or reversal of existing law. Therefore,
pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
this Court should award Mrs. Taylor double costs and reasonable
attorney's fees incurred in defending this appeal.
DATED this

I

day of

Q£ft>&&Z--

<USteven C. Tycksen
Attorney for Appellee
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
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DAVID PAUL WHITE (3441)
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
7434 SOUTH STATE STREET, #102
MIDVALE, UTAH 84047
TELEPHONE: (801) 566-8188
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
]
I

OBJECTION TO FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

;

Case No. 904904902 DA

CHARLEEN TAYLOR,

'
i

Judge Franlc G. Noel

DON SCOTT TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,

Defendant.

TO THE ABOVE-NAMED PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD HEREIN:
Notice is hereby given that the Plaintiff objects to the
purported Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as drafted and
served by you on December 4, 1992 for the following reason:
1.

The Findings and Decree should indicate that David Paul

White represents Mr. Taylor.
2. Paragraph 8 of the Findings refer to Ms. Taylor being debt
free at the time of the parties1 marriage.

This reference should

be removed as there was no evidence at trial to support such a
finding.

3.

Paragraph 9 of the Findings should indicate that the

Defendant quit her employ in 1982 and remained at home to take care
of Plaintiff's and her own children.
4.

Paragraph 12 should indicate that the parties have had no

contact since the separation in 1984.
5.

Paragraph 15 should omit the reference that Defendant

expended any of her savings funas on marital debts.

There was no

evidence presented at trial to support that finding.
6. An additional paragraph should be added to the Findings to
specify the parties lack of social and financial contact during the
separation period•
7.

Paragraph 11 of the Conclusions states that Defendant has

need of attorney's fees^ No evidence was presented as to need, nor
was there a finding of need, merely Defendant's counsel's affidavit
as to attorney's fees.
DATED this //# U\ . day December, 1992.

DAVID PAUL WHITE
Attorney for Plaintiff

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing OBJECTION TO FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
postage prepaid, to the following:
Steven C. TycJcsen
DAY & BARNEY
Attorney for Defendant
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
DATED this ll/rtl

day of December, 1992.
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In the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County
STATE OF UTAH
Case No. 904904902 DA

DON SCOTT TAYLOR
Plaintiff

Financial Declaration

vs.

CHARLEEN AYLOR
Defendant
Husband:
Address:

Dated:
Wife:
Address:

Charleen E l i z a b e t h Taylor
2128 Kayland Way
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah

84117

Soc. Sec. No.

Soc. Sec. No.:

539-26-1112

Occupation:

Occupation:

Receptionist

Employer:

Employer:

I n t e r m o u n t a i n Health Care

Birthdate:

Birthdate:

7-30-31

NOTE: THIS DECLARATION MUST BE FILED WITH THE DOMESTIC CALENDAR CLERK 5 DAYS
PRIOR TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING.
FAILURE BY EITHER PARTY TO COMPLETE. PRESENT. AND FILE THIS FORM AS REQUIRED WILL
AUTHORIZE THE COURT TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THE OTHER PARTY AS THE BASIS FOR
ITS DECISION.
ANY FALSE STATEMENT MADE HEREON SHALL SUBJECT YOU TO THE PENALTY FOR
PERJURY AND MAY BE CONSIDERED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT.
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
(NOTE: To arrive at monthly figures when income is received and deductions are made weekly, multiply by 4.3; if figures arcpn a bi-weekly
basis, multiply by 2.167)
1. Gross monthly income from:
Salary and wages, including commissions, bonuses.
allowances and overtime, payable
period)
Pensions and retirement.
Social security
Disability and unemployment insurance
Public assistance (welfare. AFDC payments, etc.).
Child support from any prior marriage
Dividends and interest
Rents
All other sources: (Specify)

TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME .
2. Itemize monthly deductions from gross income:
State and federal income taxes
Number of exemptions taken
Social security

Medical or other insurance (describe fullv).
Union or other dues
Retirement or pension fund
Savings plan
Credit union

|

HUSBAND
3

WIFE

|

$
L, 16&J57

(pay

•

s
s

s
s
1,168.6? 1
188-.79" J
l

"

89.41

Other (specify)

4. Debts and obligations:
Creditor's Name

S e a r s RoebucR
Mastercard
Mervyn's
Attorneyfs fees

$278*20

r|$

TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS.
3. Net monthly income - take home pay

Date Payable

For

Lawrilnower, c l o t h e s
Clothes/ misc.
Clothes

$890.47
Balance

2HEH

232-42
lbti.01
b^.iy

zna

1

Monthly Payment

T07UO
2b.UU
ib.UU

v a r i e s - sido.oo

[
J
J

I

$lbU.UU
J
S 70.^p
TOTAL
(If insufficient space, insert total and attach schedule)
5. All property of the parties known to me owned individually or jointly (indicate who holds or how title held: (H) Husband. (Wl Wife.
(J) Jointly).
WHERE SPACE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR COMPLETE INFORMATION OR USTING PLEASE ATTACH SEPARATE SCHEDULE.
Value
Owed Thereon
(a) Household furnishings, furniture,
appliances and equipment
lb) Automobile (Year-Make) 1978 C h e v r o l e t

S

S

1

850.00
50.00

(c) Securities - stocks, bonds

*

(d) Cash and Deposit Accounts (banks, savings & loans,
credit unions - savings and checking)

315.00

ttfest One Checkina Account
(e) Life Insurance:
Name of Company

Policy No.

Cash value, accumulated
dividend, or loan amount

Face Amount
$

S

None

(i) Profit sharing or Retirement Accounts
Name
NOELS
Name
_,
(g) Other Personal Property and Assets (specify)

None

Value of interest and amount presently vested

(h) Real Estate (Where more than one pared of real estate owned, attach sheet with identical information for all additional properrv)
AHH^.
2128 Kayland Wa^
TVoeofiWrtv
'_
Type of Property Residential
Date of AcouisitioT" A u g u s t , lSffiT
Original Cost S . 21,300
Total Present Value $ 1 0 2 , 0 0 0
Basis of Valuation , S.L. County Prop, tax
Cost of Additions S .

evaluation"

Total Cost S
Mtg. Balance S

Other Liens S
Equity S
Monthly Amortization S .
Taxes $
1,228.31

And to whom

Individual contributions

(i) Business interest (indicate name, share, type of business value less indebtedness).
None

(j) Other assets (Specify)

Montana property

6. Total monthly expenses: '(Specify which party is the custodial parent and list name and relationship of ail members of the
household whose expenses are included.)
HUSBAND

WIFE

S
Rent or mortgage payments (residence).
Real property taxes (residence)
Real property insurance (residence),
Maintenance (residence)
Food and household supplies
Utilities including water, electricity, gas and heat_
Telephone
Laundry and cleaning.
Clothing
Medical
,
Dental
Insurance (life, accident, comprehensive liability, disability) Exclude Payroll Deducted
Child care
!
Payment of child spousal support re prior marriage .
School
Entertainment (includes, clubs, social obligations, travel recreation)
Incidentals (grooming, tobacco. alcohoL gifts, and donations)
Transportation (other than automobile)
Auto expense (gas. oil. repair, insurance) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Auto payments
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Installment payment(s). (Insert total and attach itemized schedule
if not fully set forth in id) on the ilrst page hereoti m
Other expenses (Insert total and specify on attached schedule) n e w s p a p e r
TOTAL EXPENSES

106.00
'22.U0
37TUDT
166.00
3 0 . GO

20.00
101.60
33.00
16.00

5,37

55.00
25.00
12b:. 00
200.00 Iestft
15Q*00
8.24
S
1,365.04

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss.

I swear that the matters stated herein are true and correct.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
day of

. 19

Notary Public residing in Salt Lake County. Utah
My Commission Expires:
BRING TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING INFORMATION
NECESSARY TO VERIFY OR EXPLAIN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS DECLARATION. INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO. PAYROLL STUBS FOR THE MOST RECENT 90 DAYS. 3 MOST RECENT TAX
RETURNS. CREDITUNION SHARE STATEMENTS. PASSBOOKS. CHECKBOOKS. CANCELLED CHECKS,
CERTIFICATES. POLICIES AND OTHER RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION.

APPENDIX 3
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In the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County
State of Utah
Don T a y l o r

^

d

£ase No.

904904902 DA

Plaintiff

Financial Declaration

vs.

Charleen T a v l o r

Dated:

Defendant
Husband: Firm T a y l mr

Wife:

Address:
2598 V a l l e y View Ave.
Holladay, Utah

Address:

Soc. Sec. No..

Soc. Sec. No..

§29-48-9791
Occupation: Letter Carrier
Employer: ^ * ^ Postal Service
04-07-37
Birthdate:

_

Occupation: .

Employer:
Birthdate:

NOTE: THIS DECLARATION MUST BE FILED WITH THE DOMESTIC CALENDAR CLERK 5 DAYS
PRIOR TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING.
FAILURE BY EITHER PARTY TO COMPLETE. PRESENT. AND FILE THIS FORM AS REQUIRED
WILL AUTHORIZE THE COURT TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THE OTHER PARTY AS THE
BASIS FOR ITS DECISION.
ANY FALSE STATEMENT MADE HEREON SHALLSUBJECT YOU TO THE PENALTY FOR PERJURY
AND MAY BE CONSIDERED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT.
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES. ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
(NOTE: To arrive at aKMMfeiy figures wheal tecum* i* received ami deduction* are
• weekly, UNiitipJy by 4*3; If figures are ou a bi-weeaiy basis, nuiiiJpiy by 2.1*7)

j

Gross monthly income from:
Salary and wages, including commissions, bonuses.
allowances and overtime, payable «•«•••——•-——
period) .«_»_«»__-_____--__--_-_---—-——_—_
Pensions and retirement
Social security _ _ _
Disability and unemployment insurance
_ _
Public assistance (welfare. AFDC payments, etc.)
Child support from any prior marriage
Dividends and interest M _ M M M M M M M
Rents

HUSBAND

]

WIFE

ip»y

|

S

S

2.768
j

(

151.31

Sale of Montana Prop

All other sources. (Specify)

$
TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME
Itemize monthly deductions from gross income:
State ami federal income taxes
Number of exemptions taken

_ _ _ _ _
— - _ — _ _ _

Social security « M M M _ M _ M . W M . M M M _ W M . M M --.
Medical or other insurance (describe fully)
Union or other dues _ _ .
Retirement or pension fund
Savings plan — — _ _ _
Credit union - • » • « — _ _

2,919.31

s

1

S

s

614.45
2
19.37
41.06
12.22
1 fiq 701

J.
1

Other (specify)

Series

E

Jb.M

Bonds

$ 932.63

TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS
J.
4

Net monthly income 'take home pav

_

Debts and obligation*.
Creditor's Name

_

S

_

For

l,986.68

Date Payable

Balance

s
s

Monthly Payment

| 14,Ufa').bb |i — 5 r m

K a t h e r i n e Thomas
Visa

1

ZbU

^4,320.65

TOTAL

$

600

1

(If insufficient space, insert total and attach schedule)
5.

All property of the parties known to me owned individually or jointly (indicate who holds or how title held: (H) Husband. (W) Wife. (J) Jointly)
WHERE SPACE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR COMPLETE INFORMATION OR LISTING PLEASE ATTACH SEPARATE SCHEDULE
Value
Owed Thereon
(a) Household furnishings, furniture,
appliances, and equipment _ .
(b) Automobile (Year-Make)

_

500
2, UUU

1982 Toyota
1973 Pord—

_

40'J

(C) Securities - stock*, bond*

57.82
1.529.53

Dean Witter Money market

jms_

2886.37

Lnrri Ahhott Bond Deb
TVan Wirrpir U t i l i t y Fund
rioan

Uift-g-r

Tnr

Tnr

2488.05

13453,51

S&C.

AfrPi afpri Eunr

•

(d) Cah^Jno^DcpdjPYctouraiYSank*. savings 4 Io«in*.
credit unions - savings and checking)

XJ^«5f OTIP
T?-i-rct- .qfflt-P R p n k o f
/\nmrri
C.ir&Ai t" TTm* o n

Policy No.

Group Life Post "Office

(0 Profit sharing or Retirement Accounts
Name M M M M M M M - a n M H M M M W M M M _ - M
Name

United States Civil Service

(gj Other Personal Property and Assets Specify)

&

&

•

730™
750
1600

Montana

(e| Life Insurance:
Name of Company

#

Face Amount

32,000

Cash value, accumulated
dividend, or loan amount

"TO"

Value of interest and amount presently vested

$27,280.31

Addrcu
?lt. Haven Big CottdnwoocT^
s a l t Laek County, Lot ZUb, ZU7
Original Cost $

3,(100

Cost of Additions S
Total Cost X

propenyl

Type oi Property
Date of Acquisition
Total Present Value S

7 , 0 0 0
1 5 .

,..«.« wwii ioew ,ai ' t f t f j M i ^ ^ ^ i j ^ t t i o n a l

Basis of Valuation

X?72
26 . 0 0 0

county value

0 0 0

0

M i g Balance % _
Other l.iens S
Equity S _ « « _

Monthly Amortization S

laxcsS

^fifl

_ _ _ _

And to whom

pnrtnal

Individual contributions

(i)

Business interest (Indicate name, share, type of business value less indebtedness!

NONE
(!)

Other assets (Specify)

NONE

Total monthly expenses. •(Specify which party is the custodial parent and list name and relationship of alt members of the household whose
expenses are included.)

» Two s o n s , over 21, l i v i n g a t home

•wr

Rem or mortgage payments (residence)
Real property taxes (residence)

_

Real property insurance (residence)
Maintenance (residence)

_
_

~lo~

_ _ _ _ _

Food and household supplies

-

_

HUSBAND

_

_

—

450

•

Utilities including water, electricity, gas and heat
Telephone

„

10
20
JUL
30-

Laundry and cleaning
Clothing

_

_

_

_

Medical
Dental
Insurance (lile. health, accident, comprehensive Iiabilttv.
disability| Exclude Payroll Deducted
_ _ _ _ _
Child care

—

Payment ol child tpousal support re prior marriage

_

School

•

Entertainment (includes clubs, social obligations, travel recreation).
Incidentals (grooming, tobacco, alcohol, gifts, and donations)
Transportation (other than automobile)

, _ _ _ « _ _ - - _ — - - _ - _

Auto expense (gas. oil. repair, insurance)
Auto payments

_

50
_50_

•

1Q£L

—-----——-—--—-——----------——--———

Installment payment* s). (Insert total and attach itemued schedule
if not fully set forth in (d) on the first page hereof)
Other expenses (Insert total and specify on attached schedule)

TOTAL EXPENSES

1,135.00

WIFE

,~-ww _ . « • | r « « * % l «## I C « I

Address

P o t t e r Lane
Heber. Utah
26.QQQ

Original Cost S -

Total Cost S

2 7 ,

M t g Balance $
Other \.»<n% S _

Type of Property —
Oate of Acquisition
Total Present Value $

QQQ

0

JL

Equity S

Monthly Amortt/atiun S

1/3

7,?63

_ _ _ _

ia«cs$ —276,40 annual
Individual contribution*

A^riculxuraT -

TTTT
20,790
-

iumofv,.„,„o« Offered t h i s p r i c e

l.QQQ

Cost of Additions S

owncQ. a m e n sheet with identical information fpr all additionaUiroperty)

And to whom

, . „ , ~ ™ » ..*».* Mt*irw4* oaccei ot real estate owned, attach sheet with identical , n ' w WW^(<? < t4tt34^fJ O I M I ' projxnyj
Address
1 3 7 5 7 S o u t h RedWQOd
j y p c Qf pf0pefiy
.-_____________-_««
Onpn*! COM S

105,000

Date of Acquisition _
loial Pr«em V»iu« I

1984
9*7,000

COM of Ad****, J i , Aoo
T^,I COM J
infi Ann
MII •«»»—»*
14.060

a*™ of v.iuano* S o l d f o r t h a t amount
in 1 9 8 3 - f o r e c l o s e d i n 1990

Uthct l-icnk S

-

Q,

EMU.., t
81,000
Monthly Amortization S

Ta*csJ

1451. 65

Individual contribution*

nOO

And to whom

STATE OF UTAH
ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

\

I swear that the matters stated herein are true and correct.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

2&.

si
day of

J < ^ KXAO^M

! 9 ^_/

itarv Public residing in Suit LLake County. Utah
Notary
My Commission Expires:

^ °

''

BRING TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING INFORMATION
NECESSARY TO VERIFY OR EXPLAIN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS DECLARATION. INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PAYROLL STUBS FOR THE MOST RECENT 90 DAYS. 3 MOST RECENT TAX
RETURNS. CREDIT UNION SHARE STATEMENTS. PASSBOOKS. CHECKBOOKS. CANCELLED
CHECKS. CERTIFICATES. POLICIES. AND OTHER RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION.

APPENDIX 4
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,-tf-j
In the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County
STATE OF UTAH

now snrnr

TAYLOR

Casg No. qnAqOAQO? 'VIA
P!amtiff

vs.

Financial Declaration

CHARLEEN TAILOR
Defendant
Husband: DON TAYLOR
Address: 2598 V a l l e y View Ave.

Dated: 1 0 / W < » 2
Wife:
Address:

Soc. Sec. No.: 5 2 9 - 4 3 - 9 7 9 1
Occupation: L e t t e r c a r r i e r

Soc. Sec No.;

Employer: U«S> P o s t a l

Employer:

Service

Birthdate: W - 3 7

Occupation: _
Blrthdatcr.

NOTE: THIS DECLARATION MUST BE FILED WITH THE DOMESTIC CALENDAR CLERK 5 DAYS
PRIOR TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING.
FAILURE BY EITHERPAKITTO COMPLETE. PRESENT. AND FILE THIS FORM AS REQUIRED WILL
MJIHORIZE THE COURTTO ACCEPTTHE STATEMENT OFTHEOTHERPAKTYASTHE BASIS FOR
AS DECISION.
ANT FALSE STATEMENT MADE HEREON SHALL SUBJECT YOU TO THE PENALTY FOR
PEJUURYAlTOMATBEaDNSmEREDAFfUm^
STATEMENT OF. INCOME. EXPENSES. ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
TROTS: lfc arrive at

y*y Q^gflgtt—tt*pq*M mmW
HUSBAND

I Qnosa montniy income frotnr
Salary and wages, including, cotniaa^tons, bonuses,
altavmn^anfl overtime. o « v ^ mOHCOly
period*
sPenaiona and retirement.
Social security
l/isaDiilly and unemployment Insurance «»^ l l f c _
^ b * ^ assistance (wcuans, AFDC payments, etcj.
Child support from any Parlor xnarriagr _ _ _ _
uiwscnaa and interest
_
Rents
AIL other sources: (Specify).

9

|4"
2868.00

,cp«y

—IF"

3
TOTAL iMONTHLr INCOME.
2w (temtxe monthly deduct Ions from qnxa income:
.State and federal income taxes .
Number of exemptions taken ^_
Social sccuntr
Medical or other insurance (describe fuiM t
Union or.uther dues _ _ _
Retirement or pension fund .
Savings plto
Credit union

|

S

3

2368.00
604.00

2.0,30 ;
12.84

JiO.OO

*

WIFE

|

1

Other: (specify)

52ZZSI

Jledicarfi

gT7T^5T84"

70TAL MOl^IWLY DEDUCTIONS ^
3. AfemoniWyinconw-toi^/^^P^
"•
4. Debts and obligations:
Creditor's Name

T

5T^I7TT
Balance

Dace Payable

For

*A&6xti Credit: \B^Qti ILoan-prapert:? taxes)
Visa card
'
Property taxes -LWl
'

Monthly Payment

rgngu.uo

i 360.00
.121. nn

JLaflPiQQ
2J5J3.QO

4n nn

i^i^M

2&+l%a

IS

TtjTAL

(If insufficient space, inaer* total * n d attack schedule
5. AU property of the pwtfei «*•*» *> weowort indMrfuattr or (otorW(mdi«wi^h«^orhoWtWeh«id:JH)Ht«bMK».(W)Wife|
(J) Jonuiy).
WHERE SPACS IS INSUFFICIENTTORCOMPLETS INFORM^ION OR USTING PLEASE KW*

$

(a) Household furnishings, famuur*.
appliances and equipment
(M

ZZSSSS1E£BSZ3SBCSSL

SEPARATE SCHEDULS.

-sua _on_
1500-00-

3
fe) Secuiidw - s o c k s . boo<**

Bean Witter ^55ey Market grad"
yirat lav.—gA
OTS
'• - • = - ^ ^

Group Life

,

*

11 s j Qfltum
fj>oo.no.
2^afifiLHfl.

'

JJ25A-Q0L

LL^

a loafav

:;!;-:;: fir;,.
3fiT nn

a c o r n ; c r e d i t pfllon v

W Ufc Insurance

'

m* ::::

#«*:

t. ; j .
WCaahand 0*paattAcca>fn|f
SStt oaten* ~**vta»u\d Peking)
:m
•••-• "•" M ? i _ J £

•

^ ^ m

j : i n on,

Face Amount

PbUcyNb.

17,0(10 nn

InslzSsiSSal.

Caah value, accumulated
dividend, or loan amount
1 ;

. 3 _ '
—JO-.: i - s .

J ; : : * !:*•

I) Profit shatln* or Retuetn*111 Account*
tone
-^
—
*ame

Value of interest and amount presently vested

L—•

•£ Other Personal Pttwpe*t* **« *???* \***«W ,

lAdtomotiv^ & machine t o o l s
,*?-

..t ••

J

jinnn.nn

(hi Real Estate Wheresw* than one pared of realeuace owned, attach sheet with idwiOcallnibrinaUon for aU additional proparti

Big Cocconwood JCfanyon
"Tots ZUb j» 2U/

Total Coat S
Mtft. Balances.

TVp^^n^pgrrv Recreation
Date of Acquisition
1973
Total Present Value S 1 8 . 5 0 0 , 0 0
Bast* of Valuation. _ Appraisal

*

otheruen»5 160.00 otmers dues
Equity 3 _
And to whom „

Monthly A^ye^yofamtaaiiTTaxes $

L_

Inctlvtduai contributions

(0 auslneaa interest (indicate name, snare, type of bustneaa value less Indebtedness).

Other aaaeta (Specify)

'Toad mortihly expenses: -tSpeciiy which pany isttie custodial parent and list name and relationship of ail members of tlft
&ottaetK>ki|wn<w; cxpq}aca arc indudedj: -HUSBAND
{ i

/ft*:

*

s

A. .
i: !••• I ft

it t -

Fdod and household suppttea-

-

.h.

400.00

*Jfcnt:or snortgaice lwymenta (residence}.
7&al property taxes (reatdexicei:.
*1*eaf property tnsuranrc (restdencel^
^iMtgnMgaie'ffgaidgnggy '• • ".

M

I *».

* ;.•'*

:i.

400.00

- *

UUUtSe9ineitKltna:waier. deanctty, $uuindheai_
TViephone: _ :
-; i a g ' ! ; ' {- " "
Laundry and ctamnut-__^
Ctotliin*
:
MedicalDental -

-snro-

•37,00

10.00

,

Insurance (life, accident. cooiprehenaive (lability. dtsaoWtvf Eachjdc Payroll Deducted
Child care
.
Payment of child spousal support re prior marriagem
SchoolKmertainmeru linriiutea. cHiba. sortai obtijBttJons. travel recrcarionl.
Incidentals, (grooming. toUacco. alcohol, j&Uts, and.donailonsl
>
Ttanspocuukm (other Jhan automobile} _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Autoexperwe dttiH, oil?repair. Biaurancef L - L L J
'' *

^47.00

Inutailmmi paymentbl. Unseti total and attach itemized schedule
ifnot lultf setforthin (dlon thetlrst page hereon.
Otherexpenses* (Insert total and spec*y on attached schedule! S P O U S a l

JtQCLQSL

TOTAL EXPENSES

were

Support.

75.83
30,00
20,00

e

JLfi24.fi .1

Address:

Potter Lane

Type of Property:

Heber,City, Utah

JDkte of Acquisition : 1977

Original c o s t :

$26,000.00

Agriculture

Total present -value:

$20,790.^0

Cost of Additions:1,000.00
Total cost:
Mtg. Balance
Liens
Equity (1/3)

$27,000.00
0
0
$7,263.00

Address: 13757 South Redwood M.
Riverton, : Utah
Original c o s t :

$105,000.00

Cost: of Additions:
Total c o s t :
Mtx ( balance
Ljena
Equity:
Monthly Amor.
Taxes (annually)

1,400.00
106.400.00
8*000.00
0
87.000.00

360.00
1431.65

Type of property : Investment
Date of Acquisition :
Total present value.

1984
$95,000100

STATE OF UTAH

|
38.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE I

^^A^I swear that ihe matter* stated herein are true andxpirect. ^Q#r
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
{_?<?
day of O ^ T^fa^&T
- . 19 TX.
NOTARY PUBLIC

1

DIANE S-JONES

-Ox
Notary Public

; in Salt Lake County. Utah

•MM?

My Cormnission
STATE OF OTAH
BRING TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING INFORMATION
NECESSARY TO VERIFY OR EXPLAIN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS DECLARATION. INCLUDING
BUT NOT UMITED TO- PAYROLL STUBS FOR THE MOST RECENT 90 DAYS. 3 MOST RECENT TAK
RETURNS. CREDITUNION SHARESTATEMENTS. PASSBOOKS. CHECKBOOKS. CANCELLED CHECKS.
CERTIFICATES. POLICIES AND OTHER RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION.

